

results of phase II in about three or four months. This period would be otherwise not very useful for consultations due to the forthcoming presidential elections. Fortunately, an important part of the activities of phase II require a lot of cabinet work. A second training workshop for the national team was to be held at Bissau by the regional team a week after the field visit took place. This was felt necessary by both the national team and the regional team, given the long delay between the first training seminar and the real launching of the exercise.

Some technical implementation difficulties were expressed by the national team regarding the transition between phases I and II and phases III and IV. More detailed information from the regional team was requested (a four hours informal seminar was organized during the field visit to try to dissipate some of the national team doubts, but this was obviously insufficient, and a follow-up is needed by the regional team). The national team feels the need to discuss and adapt all tools and steps of the NLTPS process. This will probably mean that the regional team will have to devote more time to training and follow-up activities in this case than in other countries. Another area of foreseeable tensions between the national team and the regional team is that of the exercise calendar. The national team is working with a 25 months work programme (given by its funding agreement), which covers 1994, 1995 and up to mid-year 1996. It will be difficult for the regional team to exert pressure on the national team to complete the exercise by mid-1995. Thus, **it seems likely that, although the NLTPSs exercise in Guinea-Bissau seems to be a good candidate for a «success story» (producing a useful and technically sound long-term perspective study), final results will probably not be obtained by mid-1995.** If this is not acceptable, then new means to exert additional pressure on the national team to shorten its calendar would have to be found.

(iv) **Zambia.**

**Zambia's NLTPS is still at its initial stages.** The first contacts between the regional team leader and Government officials were made by mid-1993. The agreement (*aide mémoire*) to start the exercise was signed by UNDP and the Government of Zambia on November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1993. A formal signing ceremony took place on January 10<sup>th</sup>, 1994, giving it extensive media coverage. The NLTPS project is part of the over-all capacity building programme for economic management. The project document was signed formally on May 10<sup>th</sup>, 1994. The national team leader has already been appointed and is expected to assume her duties on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1994. The post was advertised and all candidates were interviewed by a panel including a representative of UNDP. The same format is intended to select the other three officials expected to be recruited to work for the national team. Zambia's Government has

expressed high expectations in the exercise, and is apparently willing to grant it intellectual freedom to explore future alternatives, fully assuming its participatory nature. A Steering Committee is still to be established, together with an operational programme management committee.

(v) **Swaziland.**

**Swaziland's NLTPS is still to be formalized**, mainly due to lack of funds. Swaziland's Government decided in 1989 to develop some basic instruments for economic management, including a long-term National Development Strategy covering a 25 year period. In February 18<sup>th</sup>, 1994, His Majesty the King delivered a speech (on the occasion of the state opening of the first session of the Sixth Parliament) summoning the nation to participate in defining national development priorities, expressing their views on how best to frame the country's long-term strategy. It is within this context that the NLTPS project will be undertaken. A task manager of the National Development Strategy has already been appointed, and at the time of the field visit it seemed that the African Development Bank had agreed on co-financing the exercise. However, a week later, after a visit by the NDS task manager to Abidjan, doubts were still cast as to when funds would be available.

**2. Country coverage strategy.**

No further comments are felt necessary (see previous sections; in particular, recommendation (vii), section E.3.c)

**E.4.c. Recommendations.**

The following recommendations seem appropriate:

- (i) The regional team should adopt a more aggressive position in defense of the technical rigor of the NLTPS projects. It is recognized that this is not easy, for it may deteriorate its relations with some of the national teams. Further, it is recognized that the regional team has very limited means of intervention. Thus, a more inflexible attitude should be adopted towards the initial acceptance of institutional arrangements (such as those of Côte d'Ivoire) which greatly deviate from those originally designed to ensure independence, a participatory approach, multidisciplinary, systemic and holistic views and technical competence in perspective and strategic planning. Inappropriate institutional arrangements seem to be at the roots of some of the main implementation difficulties.
- (ii) The regional team should react in writing promptly and with detailed comments and suggestions assessing the documents produced by the national teams. This comments and suggestions should be made available to the officers of the sponsoring agencies of the corresponding country exercise and the sponsoring

agencies of the African Futures Project, to the chairman of the «National Futures Commission» or corresponding advisory board of the exercise, and to the government liaison officials with the project. Any other parties which could have an influence on the national team should also be informed. Officials of the World Bank, the UNDP and the ADB could exert their influence with the governments to try to improve the implementation process if needed.

- (iii) The experience gained with the more advanced NLTPSs should be documented and used to guide the country exercises which are at an earlier stage of implementation.
- (iv) Further sensitization of the National Futures Commissions, or equivalent consultative bodies, as to what to expect from the exercise, the key elements of the process, and the methodological framework in general, would probably help them to be more useful in their important role (it must be kept in mind that they are not necessarily futures studies' experts nor strategic planners).
- (v) One main obstacle to initiating those NLTPSs where favorable conditions exist has been the lack of timely available funds to support teams. Some recommendations in this respect are made under section E.5.c, below).

## **E.5. Resource mobilization.**

### **E.5.a. Background.**

The evaluation mission was asked to examine the convenience of setting up a Trust Fund to finance the regional and national projects.

### **E.5.b. Assessment.**

The current financial arrangement has at least two main inconveniences:

- (a) First, it has produced some negative effects and introduced unnecessary delays in the launching of NLTPSs. Even when most favorable conditions have been found in a country, lack of timely funds and/or sponsors have delayed the start of the NLTPS. In some cases, once funds have been found, the delay has forced the regional team to reinitiate the sensitization process, within an environment of reduced credibility. In other cases, delays have introduced a certain degree of frustration in national team leaders who, having accepted their responsibility, are forced into a waiting impasse. In the extreme, this could make a very suitable team leader candidate opt for a different activity. In other cases, these delays have made it necessary to accommodate for retraining workshops. In any case, the lack of funds with the required opportunity has produced important delays in the launching processes of NLTPSs exercises, and this will undoubtedly have an effect on the dates when final expected outputs will be available.

- (b) Second, it reduces the possible means of influence available to the regional team to make national teams attentive to their technical demands and to comply with the agreed timetables. Further, sponsors of the national teams have their own interests and priorities, and these can be forced into the national team's attitudes and approach towards the NLTPS.

Modifications to the financing scheme to tackle these problems are needed and would be most convenient. However, the evaluation mission concluded that **no changes should be made during the present project period up to mid-1995.**

#### E.5.c. Recommendations.

**The mission strongly believes that the African Futures project should be extended**, not only because the effort is perceived by all the governments involved as particularly needed and useful, but also because the national teams with projects still on going would need continuing support to obtain the expected final results. Moreover, Africa needs to develop its own capacity to define its own long-term visions and strategic plans; above all **if the project was to stop by mid-1995 its rate of return would be very small indeed.** If the project was not to be continued, all that has been gained towards the main objective of the project, which in our opinion is considerable, is likely to disappear very soon. The possibility of developing Africa's capacity to think its long-term futures would most likely suffer a severe setback. Thus, the mission considers it appropriate **to strongly recommend considering an extension of the project beyond mid-1995, including as part of the objectives of this extension a mandate to the regional team to explore and design a phase-out programme of the current sponsoring agencies**, to be replaced by local governments and regional bodies and agencies. This phase-out programme should allow, after a reasonable period of time, the local maintenance of prospective activities in the African countries involved on a permanent basis and the survival of a certain infrastructure to sustain these activities, both nationally and regionally.

In case this recommendation is accepted and the project extended beyond its present stage, the mission considers that the financial arrangement should be modified to take into account items (a) and (b) above. However, after reviewing the **Trust Fund alternative**, it decided that **a better arrangement would be simply to provide additional funds** (beyond what would be the case otherwise) **to items «17.97. National experts» and «20. Studies Fund» of the regional project budget** (see UNDP Budget included as annex J on the Project Document for the regional project; Document